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From all the changes that the spectacular progress made in the field of 
biotechnology have brought about in western societies of the 20th century, the 
technologization of human reproduction is probably the one which will entail the most 
irreversible consequences. This is due to the fact that the radical changes engendered by 
reproductive medicine touch upon all realms of human life, social, economic, moral, 
legal but mainly because they put to question the fundamental, for western thought, 
bipolarity nature vs culture.  
In the following text I shall endeavour to follow the ruptures, the dismantlements 
and the re-conceptualizations that the new reproductive technologies have effected in 
the field of kinship. More specifically, starting with the modern anthropological 
theories of kinship, the theory of practice and the anthropological perceptions of 
biotechnology, and based on an analysis of data resulting from a long term 
ethnographic research I shall investigate through what strategies my informants (in this 
case the women who are unable to produce ova themselves for various reasons) by 
“technologising nature and naturalising technology” (Carsten 2004: 174), circumvent 
and transcend the dichotomic counterpoint of nature/ culture, so that the rupture in 
biological motherhood can “heal” and not actually cancel the aspired sense of normalcy 
regarding the family and kinship. As it will be demonstrated, the artificiality of assisted 
reproduction need not be considered as something which contravenes the formation of a 
family and kinship, since it can actually be converted to a means through which 
infertile women can take action and develop practices which contribute to the 
“naturalization” of some bonds, the blunting of others and the invention of some new 
ones- so that the “biological misfortune” can be reversed and the sense of continuity 




can be restored as it happens in the case of “normal” family and kinship1.  
The identification of the genitors and parents, that is the ones that offer their 
genetic material for a child to be born and the parents that actually raise the child, 
constitutes one of the most profound, if not the most deeply rooted ideological 
construction of the western civilization. This means that the “normal” family structure, 
in which sexuality, procreation, marriage and biological relatedness coincide, is created  
by a couple of people of a different gender who get married and have their biological 
children so that, in the eyes of the law, the husband of the mother is at the same time 
both the biological and the social father of the children. Therefore, the biological basis 
of parenthood justifies the naturalization and subsequently ensures the normalisation of 
the structure of the nuclear family (model), as well as its reduction to a core of kinship 
relations. 
However, bearing in mind that the blood relatedness outside marriage may be 
equally as biological in effect, it is nevertheless characterised as non-legal and inferior 
when it is contrasted with the legally-based blood relation (i.e the kinship which is 
formed within the framework of a marriage agreement2). On the other hand, we must 
also take into account the distance between biological motherhood and social 
fatherhood3. As a result, we have to accept that despite the stereotypical perception 
prevalent in western societies that blood ties are formed through biology/nature, 
biology in its own right produces nothing but deficient relatedness. Only marriage 
seems to be in a position to do away with this deficiency and restore the “naturalness” 
                                                 
1 The present text presents in a very condensed way the most important conclusions of the 
anthropological study that I have been carrying out since 2009 in Athens, regarding the re-
conceptualisations that the new reproduction technologies –and particularly the egg donation– have 
engendered in the conceptualization of parenthood and relatedness within the modern Greek society (see 
Tountasaki 2015). The particular study is based on concrete ethnographic data, which come both from 
personal interviews with infertile women as well as from attending the psychological support sessions 
organised by the “Kyveli” (Association for the Support of Fertility), under the supervision of a 
specialised clinical psychologist, in its office facilities every first and third Wednesday of every month. 
2 For example, the comparison between a “legitimate ”and  “illegitimate” child was not grounded in the 
lack of biological connection but in the fact that the mother was not married at the time of delivery and 
for the period (of 6-10 months prior to the birth of the child) during which the child must have been 
conceived. After all, that is why the terms “illegitimate” and “outside marriage” are used as synonyms. 
3 In western cultural mentality there is certainty concerning biological motherhood, since the biological 
relatedness with the mother is established on labour and delivery. On the contrary, the indeterminacy of 
the biological fact of maternal egg fertilisation with the paternal semen leads to a changed notion of 
father descent that takes a legal/social form, since fatherhood is established through a marital union. 
Therefore the genitor that necessarily exists in the biological domain, in order to become a father for all 
intents and purposes, to have that is the transfer of his genetic material to the child and subsequently his 
biological bond with the child acknowledged, needs to have been determined as the husband of the 
woman through lawful marriage. To quote the words of Μ. Strathern “(…) motherhood is established 
through the relation of the mother with the child while fatherhood is established through the relation of 
the father with the mother” ([1992] 2008: 305). 
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of kinship. As we can understand, we are faced with a particularly intricate and, on 
occasions, extremely imperceptible interaction between what is considered to be 
biological/natural and what is thought to be social/artificial. 
The complexity of the issues related to the ways in which the two domains, 
biology and culture, are intertwined during the establishment of relatedness will be 
highlighted in a much clearer and intense manner when the consequences induced in 
the conceptualizations of kinship after the impressive proliferation of New 
Reproductive Technologies start emerging. As it has been stressed, biotechnology 
innovations, by enabling the de-sexualization of procreation, the de-naturalization of 
conception, the detachment of child-bearing even from life itself, the dismantling of 
motherhood and the distinction between reproduction and kinship, are bound to disrupt 
perceptions of what is considered to be a “natural” bond and question the fundamental 
ideological pre-requisites of biogenetic kinship and bring both the subjects involved 
and researchers up against a long line of problems considered inconceivable in the 
past4. 
Within the Greek society the ability to procreate is regarded as something that 
goes without saying, it is considered to be a “natural capacity” and of course the desire 
to have children is also to be taken “naturally” for granted. For women especially,  the 
social construction of their identity, the construction of their “gender normality” or 
“gender proficiency” (Paxson 2004:12) is directly related to motherhood. The symbolic 
legalization of female sexuality is realized through reproduction within the framework 
of marriage (du Boulay 1986, Dubisch 1986, 1992). The impurity of the female nature 
is “transcended” and transubstantiated through the fulfilment of the sacred destiny of 
procreation through the assumption of the spiritual role of mother-wife (symbolic shift 
from the natural woman, Eve, to the sacred form of Holy Mary) always within the 
framework of the historically ever-strong normative model that the conjugal family 
constitutes (Papataxiarchis 1992:48). Therefore, cultural convictions and social 
expectations concerning biological reproduction render motherhood “a highly 
emphasized social institution” (Rushton 1992:151), a “sacred duty” dictating 
mentalities and behaviours which have a special weight in the meaning attributed to 
marriage and family, thus becoming the par excellence desired prospects of life. The 
intention of procreation proves the desire of the subjects to follow the norm, to opt for 
the beaten track, socially anticipated and, to a great extent, biologically pre-determined 
                                                 
4 See indicatively Bestard 2004, [2009] 2012, Carsten 2000, 2004, Edwards 2000, [2009] 2012, Franklin 
1997, 2013, Franklin & McKinnon 2001, Ragoné 1994, 1996, Strathern 1992, [1992]2008. 




course that everyone perceives as “normal”. 
Within a biopolitical structure, where the prevalent social construction is the one 
of reproduction as “natural” and therefore the only “choice”, normalization is what 
couples seek by having a child (Becker 2000). They try to meet the demands of the 
dominant cultural ideology, which defines “normalcy” as being in conjunction with 
social reproduction of specific versions of sexuality, parenthood and family structure. 
In other words, the social constructions of fertility, parenthood and family, distinguish 
between the normal and the abnormal/divergent and thus become norms that define the 
lives of people. Under these conditions, men and women who wish to procreate 
endeavour, through the birth of a child, to realize their personal dreams for their own 
lives while at the same time adjusting to and harmonizing with the morally charged 
definitions that the prevalent cultural ideology imposes. When they are faced with 
infertility problems during their efforts to have a child then they actually realize that not 
only they cannot satisfy their personal desire to procreate but they are also failing to 
comply with normality, as it is defined by cultural discourse - they believe that they are 
falling short of social expectations and they feel they are socially failing. The inability 
to reproduce, threatening with cancellation the creation of a “normal” (biological) 
family, is experienced like a gap in the completion of the evolutionary cycle of life, and 
constitutes one of the most important reasons of abandoning the procedure, which on 
one hand signifies the transition to social adulthood of the spouses and on the other 
hand verifies an expected response to stereotypical representations of gender identity.  
Infertility signifies the involuntary divergence from normalcy, nullifies the 
expectations and desires of the subjects to see their lives follow what is culturally 
defined as the “natural” and “normal” course of life - that is to become spouses through 
marriage, become parents through the procreation of biological children, be “normal” 
by establishing the most natural and fundamental social structure, for western societies: 
that of a family. 
The main legitimizing argument for the orientation of infertile women towards 
the technique of assisted reproduction, which is described by the term “egg donation” 5, 
                                                 
5 This is the method of IVF, which on an international level has started being applied since the mid '80s 
and in the Greek language is predominantly denoted by the term “egg donation”. In the use of the 
particular method the stages of conventional in vitro fertilization are followed but the difference lies in 
the fact that the procedure in question requires the participation of three people, two women, the donor 
and the recipient, as well as the husband/partner of the recipient. Initially the donor is subjected to 
hormonal treatment, so as to induce a controlled ovarian stimulation and ovulation. There follows the 
interventional retrieval of oocytes from the donor's ovaries, their culture and their in vitro exposure to a 
processed population of sperm cells retrieved by the husband/partner of the recipient, the in vitro culture 
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is based on the fact that this reproductive technique allows for the greatest possible 
simulation of the constituent principles of “natural” parenthood. So, the women who 
took part in my study particularly stressed the potential of the specific method to 
safeguard the inheritance of the paternal genetic substance. In other words, the use of 
third party eggs is approved as the “fairest” solution for the fertile parent. On the other 
hand the possibility of the particular technique to also salvage, to a certain extent, 
biological motherhood is also commented in a positive way. Despite limitations, the 
reproductive impairment of the women is disproved, and more importantly without 
fully cancelling the biological basis of motherhood, since the natural processes of 
gestation and labour go on defining the mother- child relation. 
This quest for the transition from the actuality of “abnormalcy” to the ideal 
“normalcy”, via the mediating involvement of the egg donor, indisputably brings to the 
surface the greatest of fears and the most crucial of doubts, both on a cultural and on a  
social level. Women are torn between their ardent desire to have a child and the 
desperation generated by the threatening -and inescapable- necessity to resort to the 
“help” of a third person. Resoundingly present through the very act of donation, a 
stranger, however, and anonymous6 and for this reason all the more mysterious and 
threatening, the donor initially seems to dominate. Indeed, in the words of my 
informants one can sense a strong preoccupation about the role and the intentions of 
this unknown woman, her origin, her personality, her physical and mainly her mental 
health. 
However, after the completion of the biomedical intervention that signifies the 
success of embryo-transfer and the beginning of a pregnancy, the women recipients of 
the eggs consciously choose to do away with any circumstance that threatens their 
effort to fuse (non biological) procreation with social reproduction. The donation itself 
is de-personified, the donor becomes invisible and is objectified while the eggs, 
detached from her body, are turned into abstract material entities, they acquire the 
                                                                                                                                                    
of the fertilized eggs for 2-6 days, and the selection of those that present the best morphological 
characteristics. Finally there comes the transfer and implantation of the fertilized eggs in the uterus of the 
recipient. This means that the embryo is created by the genetic material of one woman, but it feeds 
through the placenta and grows in the uterus of another woman, who will then give birth to the child and 
undertake the task of raising it. 
6 According to current legislation (law 3089/2002, law 3301/2005), the clinics of medically assisted 
reproduction are the ones that bear the exclusive responsibility for the choice of the donor. Equally  
explicit, with the prohibition of any kind of financial return to the donor, the legislative texts impose 
absolute anonymity among the parties involved, as well as the child to be born. So the identity of the egg 
donor is not made known to the future parents and, vice versa, the identity of the child and his/her parents 
is not revealed to the donor. The only accessible information regards medical data, concerning clinical 
and lab tests, to which the donors are obliged to be subjected in order to rule out the likelihood of 
hereditary genetic or contagious diseases transmission (Article 8, section 9, L. 3305/2005). 




properties of a “drug” which is destined to “cure” the recipients' infertility. 
“I didn't want to know nor find out anything at all. I didn't want to think that there exists a 
person [meaning the donor] in order to feel it [meaning the child] more something of mine. I 
didn't want to have any contact whatsoever. And since that time I haven't even talked about it 
with my husband, never said anything about the subject, it's done and that's it, since the day of 
the embryo-transfer, that's it, we have never, ever mentioned anything about it at all. It's like 
taking a medicine to get well. I have never thought about her [the donor], ever again. Now I 
have forgotten all about it. When I found out about the study you are carrying out I said to 
myself: Oh yes! I, too, have done this sort of thing, and that about covers it. Now, is this good 
or bad? I don't know. I'm over it. If I wasn't concerned about health issues, the only thing that 
troubles me is whether or not she had some kind of health problem that could be hereditary 
and my daughter could be at risk”, I wouldn't think about it at all (Ismini, 9/11/2010)7. 
Converging with or drawing from legislation and the current practices of assisted 
reproduction clinics, my informants stressed the urgent necessity to find strategic 
practices which will efface the donor as a person or rather reduce it to the level of the 
“impersonal gamete” and therefore eliminate it and allow themselves and their 
husbands to normalise the use of third party eggs and at the same time safeguard for 
themselves total exclusivity of parental identity. In this way the established anonymity 
covering all parties involved, the total concealment of the use of third party genetic 
material, the de-personification of the donation and its insulation within the limits of an 
impersonal commercial transaction become fundamental mechanisms which, by 
enabling the recipient/candidate mother to appear as the true biological parent, 
contribute to the ability of this biomedical method to imitate the natural reproductive 
process. 
“This is not a donation; I gave money, she gave eggs, nor is it borrowing because I am not 
going to give them back. They are from a stranger, offered for a fee. In this way there is no 
likelihood of this ever getting out in the open, nobody else knows but the couple themselves. I 
don't see why it should be announced to the child, this is no adoption with documents involved, 
in which case somebody knows and word gets out in the circle of acquaintances and therefore 
it is better to tell the child while young. Now, however, the child doesn't need to know, besides 
it is your child alone and cannot find the donor anywhere, there is anonymity established, how 
can he/she look for her? In adoption the child may ask you to reveal the identity of his/her 
parents in order to find them and then choose what to do. But in the case of the donor what 
can you possibly say, it's like directing him/her towards a tunnel, lost in space, searching to 
                                                 
7 In the extracts of discussions and interviews quoted in the text the names of the interviewees are all 
pseudonyms and the dates denote the time of the interview. In the case of extracts from conversations 
made within the framework of the “Kyveli” meetings (in which case the name of the KYVELI 
Association is denoted by Capital letters) the date regards the time of the respective session.  
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find who he/she really is and asking you then why you don't know the identity of the donor and 
since the law prohibits your finding out your child will only wonder where he/she came from” 
(KYVELI, 15/9/2010). 
There is no doubt that the most important implication engendered as a result of 
the necessary mediation of third party eggs concerns the annulment of the maternal 
genes' contribution  to the genetic make up of the child and consequently the rupture in 
the biological continuity of kinship on the mother's side. 
In western societies the dominant ideology of kinship, as it is condensed in the 
proverb “blood is thicker than water”, demands to regard as “true” the kinship that 
emanates from the biological connection of the genetic parents with their children. The 
blood proves to be a synonym of biogenetic substance, which through the reproductive 
procedure is passed down to the descendants and becomes in this way the statutory 
principle of kinship. Up until the diffusion of new reproductive technologies the 
knowledge of biological ties safeguarded and at the same time justified the kin 
relatedness, to the extent that by definition genitors and parents became one and the 
same thing, as mentioned above and the children were regarded as a result of their 
fusion following conditions of absolute equation of the biogenetic material of both 
genetic parents. This means that the western representation of bilateral kinship comes 
from the acknowledgement of the equal contribution of both maternal and paternal 
genes for the conception of a child. According to this rationale the annulment of the 
mother's biological contribution seems to be annihilating the very identity of 
motherhood and at the same catalysing maternal inheritance. The sense of a “foreign” 
genetic material which, penetrating their body, will carry along the biological 
inheritance of a “foreign” line of genealogy causes the recipients intense fear and even 
panic while it raises questions in their minds regarding the maintenance of family 
identity and the inclusion of the child in the parents’ kin network.  
“My grandfather wanted grandchildren, to carry on the line. My mother only had one child, 
me, my uncle -who was the boy and the apple of his eyes – had no children whatsoever and as 
a result I am left with a burden on my shoulder, which is difficult to bear. I can tell you that I 
am the last branch of the family tree and it is entirely up to me to carry on our family line. 
Precisely at the time when I wanted to have a child this news came down on me like a ton of 
bricks, and all things combined, menopause included, everybody is turning to me too eager to 
hear the good news and now what am I to tell them, what can I fight against- and let me tell 
you seriously that I would rather die than have my mother find out. I have told her about the 
IVF, she believes that it will be with my own eggs and that because of my age my ovulation is 
not good  [meaning that is why I am gong ahead with the IVF in the first place], I have told 
her so many lies but I don't want her ever to find out about this thing for as long as she lives 




and this is because of the lack of kinship- that is I don't want her to find out that I am going to 
have some stranger's child  and that in effect our family line on the side of my grandfather is 
over. I don't want her ever to find out, lest she gets hurt, lest she suffers. To me the child will 
be no stranger and I believe that my mother will love him/her, I don't have any concerns that  
her behaviour would be different otherwise, however I know that unable to help it she may cry 
herself to sleep at nights. For her it would be the end to our line. It will signify our end. When 
I got engaged my uncle actually said to me “I am waiting to see a positive pregnancy test and 
then I really will be overjoyed”. So, it feels like a mountain has fallen on my shoulders and I 
am faltering, struggling to stand on my feet to carry it, there is the succession of the family 
line involved. I wanted to carry on, to perpetuate their blood. The name has not been passed 
down, you and me may think these things ridiculous based on cold logic, unacceptable given 
my education and ideology, however my heart and soul is still struggling to cope and now I 
am waiting for the moment when I become a mother in order to choose family names, if I have 
one child I shall name him/her after my uncle or grandfather so that their names can be heard 
again. I feel this weight crushing me, this unbearable burden and it is absurd and I can see the 
absurdity of it all and I've been trying to use my reasoning and rationalize it and get it off my 
chest”(Myrsini, 20/10/2010). 
So, no matter how much women fear that the donated genetic material 
undermines the normal models of parenthood and relatedness (which is precisely those 
that it is called upon to support and ascertain) they prefer, nevertheless, to proceed to 
rearrangements and re-definitions which will allow them to make peace with the 
“alternative” -and therefore socially questionable as non-acceptable- form of 
motherhood, which the biomedical technique of egg donation can offer them. They 
adopt radical ways in order to bring their desire to “create a child” to fruition and to 
experience motherhood, verifying the opinion that Ch. Thompson (2005) held, 
analysing her own research data, that timely desire for procreation governing parental 
plans does not only aspire to the creation of children but also equally serves the 
objective of the construction of parenthood (making parents) that is the construction of 
parental identity through the birth of a child. 
 “You become a parent through having a child, which means that it is the child that makes the 
parent. From a person you become a parent. Literally in the sense of construction, like making 
a thing (KYVELI, 18/11/2009). 
Manipulating established stereotypes that dictates paternal and maternal genes to 
contribute equally to the conception of the child, the recipients of the eggs /intended 
mothers attempt the re-definition of bodily substances hierarchy in what concerns their 
contribution to the establishment of motherhood, so that the emphasis be shifted from 
the biogenetic substance to gestation, labor and delivery and, afterwards, maternal 
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breast feeding. This is about the “dismantling” as Μ. Strathern calls it, of the intricate 
entity reflected in the figure of the mother in order to distinguish between its different 
constituents and to attribute a different gravity to the components  that make up the role 
of the mother (2008 [1992]: 310). In this light, oocytes, gestation and labour, which are 
the biological foundations of “natural” motherhood, acquire a different meaning 
through processes of cleavage and split into well-distinguished separate entities.  
During this process, the thwarting of genetic inheritance due to maternal genes  
through oocytes is downgraded and hushed up while, on the contrary, the importance of 
gestation is highlighted emphatically so that all biological signifiers be attributed to the 
pregnancy and the delivery of the child. The intervention of the uterus of the candidate 
mother, which safeguards the necessary environment for the growth of the foetus, is 
presented as something that constitutes a statutory condition, perfectly capable of 
nullifying the consequences of absence of genetic substance. According to my 
ethnographic data the blood-relationship ties with the mother appear not to emanate 
from the genetic inheritance of genes but by birth itself, in the broader sense of the 
word, which alludes to the gestation-labour complex. The body substances, the blood 
and placenta that feed the embryo until the end of the gestation period, are called upon 
to make up for the deficit of maternal genes and in this way to form the biological 
background of the connection between the pregnant woman and the child.  
“ It feeds on my blood, lives because my heart is beating, biologically speaking if you were to 
take this embryo and leave it in the environment it would die, it is in my body that it will 
become a human being , it will live, I will give it life, I'm providing the environment it needs to 
survive, it will feed through my body” (Myrsini 20/10/2010). 
This is an important reversal of the current western conceptualization of kinship: 
from the genes we are now passing to the “consubstantiality”, the significance of the 
“same substance”, which however is no longer defined based on the share of genes, but 
the physical substances transferred from the body of the pregnant woman to that of the 
embryo during gestation. D. Schneider, reducing the concept of “substance” to an 
analytical term for the study of kinship underlines that in the Euro-American society 
blood relatedness is a relation of common and shared substance, it is the relation 
created through the inheritance of biogenetic material ([1968]1980: 25). Thus the 
blood, identified with biogenetic substance is elevated to a statutory symbol of kinship. 
However, the metaphorical significance of blood for the conceptualization of 
relatedness does not necessarily constitute an axiom and a foregone conclusion that 
blood is to be identified with genes. As J. Edwards suggests we do, we must now take 




into account the “multivalency of ‘blood’” when we examine the significance of 
genetics and genealogy in what concerns the establishment of kin relatedness in modern 
European societies. Established convictions, according to which blood alludes to 
biogenetic relations and denotes biological descent, are shaken- if not altogether 
discredited- by the ethnographic data of recent anthropological research, which indicate 
that in the conceptualization of agents, the blood ties are not “forged ” by exclusively 
following the passing down of genetic material and, therefore, biologically grounded 
relations are not necessarily identified with the genealogical ties that go back to genes. 
“The notion of shared blood as constituting relatedness is powerful, but it cannot 
axiomatically be reduced to either the biogenetic specifically or to biology more 
generally” (Edwards [2009] 2012: 10).  
Indeed, the analysis of what my informants claim allows me to reach the 
conclusion that the symbolic and metaphorical significance of blood retains its weight 
in what concerns the establishment of motherhood, however the blood is not necessarily 
acknowledged as coterminous with biogenetic substance. The interviews I had, clearly 
reflect the way in which the genetic contribution of the ovaries is downgraded, while 
the blood that flows between the uterus and the embryo, the nourishment and the 
somatopoetic practice of gestation are highlighted as the fundamental values that 
govern the biological connection between mother and child. In the linear hereditary 
transmission of the paternal and maternal blood there comes the blood of gestation to 
be added, blood which may not be genetic but it is transferred through the umbilical 
cord from the mother to the embryo, establishing motherhood and constructing the 
maternal relation in terms of biological continuity.  
Through the counterpoint of genes and blood the genetic constituents to the 
maternal role (genes) are distinguished from the biological, non- genetic ones (blood, 
placenta). The oocytes donated are not acknowledged as capable of attributing the 
capacity of mother to the donor. The genetic identity here is not necessarily followed by 
a social relation. Therefore, the stereotypical notion that condenses the most basic 
axiom of western essentialism is transgressed, which means that “blood can in fact be 
thinner than water” when that the biological connection of the child with the donor is to 
be breached. With these conceptual paradigm shifts, the break-down of the genetic 
connection between the child and the woman pregnant with it, is counterbalanced. The 
child-bearing is re-naturalized, it gains the features of a natural phenomenon and, in the 
end, the body of the intended mother does not lose its functional significance for the 
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establishment of motherhood. The nourishment of the embryo until the time of 
gestation completion by the body of the intended mother and then, after birth, lactation, 
upbringing, and the care of the child now become dominant features of the maternal 
role. 
“Motherhood begins inside you from the time the little baby starts to move and you know that 
it is feeding through you, through your own blood, and it feels what you feel through the 
placenta. It is then that you feel that it is something of yours, a part of you, it is from that time 
that you start loving the little child and of course when you give birth to it you truly adore it. 
When I gave birth and they brought me the baby to breast-feed  you could see that need, 
opening the little mouth and asking for milk, crying and I kept thinking at that moment that the 
baby needs me and wants me to feed him with my milk,when you see him needing you from 
such a young age it is then that maternal affection starts , you are overwhelmed with emotions 
and you can't help thinking that such a tiny little creature needs me, to feed him , and not only 
that but to protect him in life, in every domain of his life, to give him money to study, to dress 
him, to be by his side for whatever he needs, in sickness and in everything else, even when he 
starts his own family, because you know that the Greek mother does not get everything over 
with when the son gets married, on the contrary she gets in deeper I would say, she babysits 
for the grandchildren, in fact I will enjoy this, looking after the kids, that is I would like to be 
active and useful throughout the course of his life (Thalia, 14/7/2010). 
The genetic bond, which pertains to the donor but does not allude to the creation 
of a kin relatedness, is circumvented so that the “epigenetic bond”8 can be assimilated. 
The latter bond is established through gestation, lactation and child-raising. If the 
anonymous donor, who by the way is never mentioned in the words of my informants 
as the genetic mother, offers the oocyte, the intended recipient mother offers the 
biological substances of her body. The notion of body substances offer denotes active 
participation, the intentional action of the recipient in order to establish her relation 
with the child as a maternal one- in contrast with the passive contribution of the donor 
for whom the concession of the oocytes signifies at the same time her refusal to 
acknowledge any biological relatedness with the child. The use of ovaries does not 
have consequences for the social reproduction of the donor or, as M. Konrad points out, 
“the donors produce but are not reproduced” (1998). The relation with the donor is then 
determined by the biogenetic determinants of genealogy criteria, however this is a 
relation which the implicated agents choose never to render active, since for the donor 
the egg donation does not signal her intention to cultivate and therefore experience 
blood relatedness with the child. Moreover, on the opposite side, the intended recipient 
                                                 
8The term “epigenetic bond” is proposed by G. Delaisi de Parseval, who distinguishes it from the genetic 
one, stressing that “epigenetics describes the unison of environmental processes which influence the 
expression of the genetic bond” ([2008] 2013: 288, footnote 259).  




mother with her husband impose the absolute delimitation of the third party biological 
presence so that this presence will be bound to remain “without history”. Neither the 
parents, nor the child later, will ascribe a social use or a social acknowledgement to this 
presence, in fact the parents will not allow it, lest it should lead to entering into 
procedures of social and symbolic exchanges with the donor. Thus the genealogical  
connection with the donor, remaining inactive and inert, is excluded from the realm of 
practical kinship, from the privileged nexus of practical relations which, as P. Bourdieu 
stresses, includes all genealogical relations that through a constant labour of 
maintenance are kept in an active state in order to meet the demands of every day 
reality ([1980] 2006: 267). 
“In the case of adoption he/she [the child] is ravaged by why they were abandoned by their 
mother, thinking perhaps I should meet her because things could be better by living with her . 
While here you know with absolute certainty that it never crossed the donor's mind to have the 
child herself, she just offered the genetic material. I believe that no donor would look for the 
child, while a mother who placed her child for adoption may want it in the future, but a donor 
who has only given an egg can't have feelings of some kind, I don't think so because I suppose 
they do this [donating eggs] many times” (Alkmini, 17/12/2012). 
After all, the special physical connection between the mother and the child during 
gestation seems to work in an equally offsetting way as well as in regard to the absence 
of the inherited “biological” resemblance. That is, while the passing down of the 
maternal phenotypical characteristics is annuled, the placenta and the body substances 
are thought to “transmit” elements and properties which influence decisively not the 
physiognomy but definitely the character of the child, so that in the end similarities 
with the mother are “constructed”, and in fact they are so readily identifiable that they 
can totally mask, in the eyes of the wider circle of relatives the absence of maternal 
biogenetic substance. 
“During the pregnancy period the baby will get some things from me, too. It will feed through 
my blood, surely the baby won't get my external features, however I believe that it will take 
after my habits, my virtues, my flaws. I believe that upbringing ,too, plays a major role. First 
of all I will be feeding the baby with my blood but also with my behaviour. It will have a part 
of me, too” (Alkisti, 15/10/2010).  
At the same time my material reveals that the care, the affection and the total 
devotion to the upbringing of the child also create the conditions for the “construction” 
of resemblance since the emotional bond contributes once again so that the child can 
“take after” the mother in many different ways. 
“Don't worry, when you take care of it, you will bring it up day by day, it will feed on your 
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love, it will take after you, too. The baby takes the eyes of the person that looks after it” 
(KYVELI, 3/11/2010). 
Where the absence of biogenetic substance threatens to create a breach in the 
cohesion of relatedness, the selection of an egg donor whose cast of features are similar 
to those of the parents is also employed as a strategy, so that the construction of 
maximum possible outer appearance resemblance, mainly between the child and the 
mother, can restore the continuity of kin relatedness on both a visible and a physical 
level.  
The insistence on finding and recognizing similarities indicates that, in the case of 
third party genetic material used, there is a great effort made to validate the 
incorporation of the child in the family group through the achievement of its 
physiognomical resemblance with the members of this group. In other words, an 
endeavour is made to undermine the lack of continuity in the domain of biologically 
grounded relations with the continuity that appearance similarities make up for as 
regards visible and physical features. Where the lack of biogenetic substance threatens 
to create a breach in kin relatedness cohesion, similarities “even if they are not always 
biological nevertheless always serve a positive purpose” (Marre & Bestard [2009]2012: 
78), raising them to a fundamental means for the acknowledgement of family identity 
and the strengthening of kinship. Physiognomical similarities, even if they cannot be 
reduced to hereditary transmission of biogenetic substance are equated to biology, to 
the extent that they concern the body, in its visible and outer form (Fortier 2009: 272). 
Under these conditions the construction of physiognomy resemblance provides the 
opportunity for re-conceptualizations and redefinition of a quasi biologically grounded 
relation between the mother and the child. This means that through the effort to achieve 
physiognomy identification between the mother and the child the neonate is enrolled in 
a genealogy line (relatedness group) which is not based on biogenetic inheritance but 
endeavours are made to structure it based on the kinship that similarities establish 
between their bodies. In other words, the demand for the construction of phenotypical 
similarities aims at the strengthening of ties with the parent who does not establish 
parenthood in conjunction with the transmission of his/her genetic material by 
subverting the precariousness of kinship relations that the lack of biological connection 
entails. In this way, despite the cancellation of the mother's biogenetic contribution, 
resemblance goes on functioning as an indicator of family identity, it goes on 
safeguarding the reconnaissance of kinship ties, so that family continuity can be 
ascertained. The verification of the physiognomy similarity of the child with the 




parents, and if this is not absolutely possible, the resemblance with any other member 
of the bilateral kinship group, serving the cultural demand of inheritance continuation, 
allows for the circumvention of the cancelled genetic contribution on the part of the 
mother without placing biological parenthood under threat. 
So, the meaning of transmission and contribution of physical substances, in 
conjunction with the construction of physiognomical similarities denote the active 
participation, the intentional action of the intended recipient mother who, in order to 
counteract her lack of maternal genes contribution, establishes her biological 
connection with the child. Therefore the establishment of motherhood and kin 
relatedness is once again reduced to biological terms, blood ties, only this time blood is 
not regarded as synonymous to genes. When women are faced with the medically 
diagnosed irreversible infertility of theirs they approve on one hand the option of egg 
donation and on the other hand they allow some room for themselves to acknowledge 
certain biological characteristics, to “shape” them, to assemble them and to circumvent, 
dismantle and deconstruct some other features in such a way as to annihilate their 
cultural significance and then proceed to re-conceptualizations and redefinitions of 
kinship relations. To the sperm and eggs which, according to G. Delaisi de Parseval, are 
acknowledged as the par excellence “bodily agents of kinship”, blood and milk are  
added, illustrating that in reality all these constitute “social and fantasy secretions 
which are readily re-interpreted both by society and by the unconscious of the users 
(the recipients) but also the “providers” (the donors)” ([2008] 2013: 277-278). My 
interviewees construct their relatedness with the child through the “same substance” of 
the bodies, through the common substances, which are transferred from their body to 
the body of the child and also through the physiognomy likeness that they create 
between these two bodies. This is in fact a new form of biological relatedness, which, 
even though it is not expressed in terms of a common biogenetic substance, it is not 
identified with the bonds that genes are thought to transmit, it acquires a meaning as 
biological, since it goes on drawing on the body and therefore it is rightfully considered 
equally strong. I think that here we can actually talk about a “corporal affinity” (parenté 
de corps), expanding the notion that C. Fortier introduced in order to define the kinship 
that, in the cases of heterologous in vitro fertilisation, is interwoven between the 
candidate parents and the child based on the construction of physiognomical 
resemblance (2009:274). In the basic distinction between genetic bonds, which emanate 
from the transmission of biogenetic substance during the process of reproduction and 
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the purely social relations, intervene the biological/corporal parenthood as a result of 
intentional construction. It is not a “natural” process but is built through processes of 
kinning, which as we said are formed on the basis of blood, not as a biogenetic 
substance but as a constituent substance to gestation, maternal milk, the care of 
upbringing and the construction of phenotypical similarities. In other words through 
performance or accomplishment. When my informants are faced with the cancellations/ 
change of plan that infertility entails they become involved in what Ch. Thompson calls 
“ontological choreography”, they handle and put together elements from different 
ontological categories (nature, culture) in order to manage to harmonize their conscious 
desire to have a child with the biological demands of the western conceptualizations of 
kinship. It is all about a dynamic combination of “surprisingly everyday strategies for 
naturalizing and socializing particulars traits, substances, precedents, and behaviours” 
(Thompson 2001:175).  
In conclusion, according to my findings my informants, faced with their medically 
diagnosed inability to procreate, do not abandon their parental project to “create the 
child”, nevertheless. On the contrary, by choosing to reduce the state of the medical and 
social liminality to which their infertility condemns them, they normalise and naturalise 
the biomedical method of egg donation. Within, but also against the dominant 
structures, the agents activate a wide range of strategies: gradual overshadowing of the 
mediating intervention of third parties (doctors and donor) and entrenchment of their 
contribution in the limits of an economic transaction, devaluation of the contribution of 
the third party genetic material and limitation of this material in what concerns the 
creation of the new person's identity. On the other hand, the conceptualization of 
kinship by blood in terms that allude to the “gestational” (meaning non-genetic 
biological) and not the “genetic” meaning of blood and the establishment of 
motherhood in relation to terms that concern gestation, birth, lactation, the care 
involved in upbringing but also to the timeliness of the recipients' decision to “make an 
effort ” to have a child, all of this is turned into strategic practices in the hands of the 
women, capable of composing that non-biogenetic kinship which can also be “real” or, 
in other words, indicating that genetics is not the only factor that can create a “natural” 
bond.  
With the re-conceptualizations and the redefinitions of biological data, through “a 
constant movement between the significance and insignificance, the foregrounding and 
backgrounding, the emphasis and underestimation of biological connections” (Edwards 
[2009]2012:14), my informants seem to refute the axiom that nature necessarily 




constitutes the fundamental basis of sociality. By ascribing meaning to their kinship 
relations through new compositions of elements, symbols and metaphors, biology is 
stressed at times and nurture at others, without caring about determining each time what 
is innate and what is acquired, the women “deal a new hand in the cards” of kinship. 
The way in which social agents conceptualize and experience kinship, a way that 
renders clear the content of counterpoint between nature and nurture, what is stable and 
what remains to be formed, what is and what is to be done, in the end leads to the 
acknowledgement that kinship should not be exclusively considered to emanate from 
being but also from acting. The intended recipient mothers can reject the monolithic 
subordination of kinship to biology and, conversely, legitimize the kinship that is 
constructed through achievement. Their action highlights the cultural interventions in 
the biological facts of reproduction and, therefore, the establishment of relatedness. In 
this manner, nature which is subjected to the intentional interventions of human 
ingenuity is turned into a place of artificiality, since it is realised by means of human 
practice. The analysis of my ethnographic data seems to corroborate the final 
conclusion reached by P. Wade that “the dividing line between 'nature' and 'culture' is 
by no means clear, since it is characterised by ambiguity and is subject to expediency 
strategies. Furthermore, it seems that culture is capable of shaping the human character 
and the human pattern of relatedness not as a coating of nature but within the 
framework of a competition on equal terms between the two” ([2002]2009: 223). The 
strategies of dismantling and re-assembling biological facts that the subjects endeavour 
denote the normalisation of hybrid conjunctions of the natural and the artificial and 
highlight the transformation of nature through technique, the perception of nature as 
“modelled on culture understood as practice. Nature will be known and remade through 
technique and will finally become artificial, just as culture becomes natural” (Rabinow 
1996:99).  
On the whole, assisted reproduction has led both the subjects themselves and the 
field of theoretical analysis to important dismantlements, re-conceptualizations and 
revisions, which problematise the established for western societies identification of 
kinship with the “naturalness” of biogenetic connection. And it may be the case, as I 
implied at the beginning of the present text, that the nature/culture interaction has 
always rendered feasible, possibly more than we believe, the manipulations and 
negotiations on the level of kinship but I think that with reproductive biotechnology we 
can now speak of a “shift of tectonic plates”, fundamental changes in the way we shall 
       Eirini Tountassaki 
 
173 





Becker Gay 2000. The Elusive Embryo. How Women and Men Approach New 
Reproductive Technologies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bestard Joan 2004. “Kinship and the new genetics. The changing meaning of 
biogenetic substance”, Social Anthropology, 12, 3:253-263. 
Bestard Joan 2012 [1st edition 2009]. “Knowing and Relating: Kinship, Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies and the New Genetics”, in Edwards J. & C. Salazar 
(Ed.) European Kinship in the Age Of Biotechnology, pp.19-28. New York, 
Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Bourdieu Pierre 2006 [1980]. Le sens pratique. (translated in Greek by Th. Paradellis, 
Postface Kanakis Leledakis). Athens: Alexandria. 
Carsten Janet (ed.), 2000. Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of 
Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Carsten Janet 2004. After Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Delaisi de Parseval Geneviève 2013 [2008]. Famille à tout prix. (translated in Greek by 
D. Tsarmakli, proofreading G. Abatzoglou & Ζ. Papaligoura-Ralli). Athens: 
Papazisis publications.  
Dubisch Jill (Ed.) 1986. Gender and Power in Rural Greece, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Dubisch Jill 1992. “Social gender, kinship and religion: Reshaping the anthropology of 
Greece” in Papataxiarchis & Th. Paradellis (Ed.) Identities and Gender in Modern 
Greece. Anthropological approaches, pp. 99-126. Athens: Kastaniotis and 
University of the Aegean Editions (in Greek). 
du Boulay Juliet 1986. “Women-Images of Their Nature and Destiny in Rural Greece”. 
In J. Dubisch (Ed.), Gender and Power in Rural Greece, pp. 139-168. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Edwards Jeanette 2000. Born and Bred: Idioms of Kinship and New Reproductive 
Technologies in England. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Edwards Jeanette 2012 [1st edition  2009]. “The Matter in Kinship”.In J. Edwards & C. 
Salazar (Ed.). European Kinship in the Age οf Biotechnology. New York, pp. 1-18. 
Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Fortier Corinne 2009. “Quant la ressemblance fait la parenté”,in E. Porqueres i Gené 




(Ed.), Défis contemporains de la parenté, pp. 251-276. Paris: Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales.  
Franklin Sarah 1997. Embodied Progress. A cultural account of assisted conception. 
London: Routledge. 
Franklin Sarah 2013. Biological Relatives. IVF, Stem Cells, and the Future of Kinship. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Franklin Sarah and Susan McKinnon, 2001 (Ed.), Relative Values: Reconfiguring 
Kinship Studies. Durham: Duke University Press.  
Konrad Monica 1998. “Ova Donation and Symbols of Substance: Some Variations on 
the Theme of Sex, Gender and the Partible Body”. The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, 4, 4: 643-667. 
Marre Diana and Joan Bestard 2012 [1st edition 2009], “The Family Body: Persons, 
Bodies and Resemblance”. In J. Edwards & C. Salazar (ed.), European Kinship in 
the Age of Biotechnology, pp.64-79. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Papataxiarchis Euthymios 1992. “Introduction. From the point of view of Gender. 
Anthropological Perceptions of Modern Greece”, in Papataxiarchis & Th. 
Paradellis (ed.) 1992. Identities and Gender in Modern Greece. Anthropological 
approaches, pp. 11-98. Athens: Kastaniotis and University of the Aegean Editions 
(in Greek). 
Paxson Heather 2004. Making Modern Mothers. Ethics and Family Planning in Urban 
Greece. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Rabinow Paul 1996. Essays on the Anthropology of Reason. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ragoné Heléna 1994. Surrogate Motherhood. Conception in the Heart. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Ragoné Heléna 1996. “Chasing the blood tie: surrogate mothers, adoptive mothers and 
fathers”. American Ethnologist, 23(2):352-365. 
Rushton Lucy 1992. “Motherhood and the symbolism of the body”, in Papataxiarchis  
& Th. Paradellis (ed.) 1992 Identities and Gender in Modern Greece. 
Anthropological approaches, pp. 151-170. Athens: Kastaniotis and University of 
the Aegean Editions (in Greek). 
Schneider David M. 1980 [1st edition 1968]. American Kinship: a Cultural Account. 
Chicago:University of Chicago Press. 
Strathern Marilyn 1992. After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century. 
       Eirini Tountassaki 
 
175 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Strathern Marilyn 2008 [1992]. Reproducing the Future, Anthropology, kinship and 
new reproductive technologies. (translated in Greek by P. Bourlakis). Athens: 
Ellinika Grammata publishing. 
Thompson Charis 2001. “Strategic Naturalizing: Kinship in an Infertility Clinic”, in S. 
Franklin & S. McKinnon (ed.), Relative Values: Reconfiguring Kinship Studies, 
175-202. Durham: Duke University Press.  
Thompson Charis 2005. Making Parents. The Ontological Choreography of 
Reproductive Technologies. Cambridge Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press. 
Tountasaki Eirini  2015.  “The child growing inside you will take after you, too”. Egg 
donation, Motherhood and Kinship. Athens: Patakis Publications (in Greek). 
Wade Peter 2009[2002], Race, Nature and Culture. An anthropological approach. 

































                                                              Corporal Affinity 
 
 
176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
